韓国政府　対北制裁違反疑いの無国籍船を拿捕 04/05/24（聯合ニュース）

韓国当局が対北朝鮮制裁違反への関与が疑われる無国籍船を拿捕したことが分かった＝３日、釜山（聯合ニュース）

　安保消息筋によると、当局は先月３０日ごろ、南西部の全羅南道・麗水付近の海上で制裁違反行為に関与した疑いのある３０００トン級の貨物船を拿捕した。

　停船命令に応じなかったため、海洋警察が船内に入って釜山南港に移動させたという。船舶には当時、中国人の船長と中国人やインドネシア人の船員１３人が乗っていた。

　この船舶がどのような違反行為に関与したのかは明らかにされていない。船舶側が貨物室の開放を拒否しており、当局は船内の貨物を確認できていないという。

　２０１７年に採択された安保理の「制裁決議２３９７」は、国連加盟国が禁止行為に関与した疑いのある船舶を自国の領海上で拿捕、検査、抑留することができると定めている。　

石炭積んでロシアに向かっていた拿捕船、２月には北朝鮮貨物を中国に 04/05/24（東亜日報）

政府当局が拿捕して抑留中の３千トン級バルク船（ＤＥＹＩ号）が、２月には北朝鮮で貨物を積んだ後、中国に運搬したことが分かった。韓国政府は、北朝鮮の南浦（ナムポ）港で無煙炭を積んだ後、ロシアに向かっていたこの船舶を米国の要請を受けて先月末に拿捕した。これに先立ち、この船舶が中国にも北朝鮮の石炭などを輸出したことが今回確認された。国連安全保障理事会の対北朝鮮制裁決議は、北朝鮮の石炭輸出などを厳しく制限している。

４日の東亜（トンア）日報の取材を総合すると、韓米当局は、ＤＥＹＩ号が政府に摘発される約１ヵ月前の２月に船舶自動識別装置（ＡＩＳ）をオフにして北朝鮮付近で貨物を積み込み、これを中国で荷揚げしたと見ている。政府消息筋は、「この船舶が対北朝鮮制裁を違反したと韓米が判断した主な状況」と明らかにした。この船舶は、南浦港など北朝鮮の港に入港したり、近隣の海上で積み替える方式で石炭などを運んだとみられる。最近、北朝鮮と中国の近海では、違法な積み替え活動と疑われる船舶が多数出現したという。

ＤＥＹＩ号が今年１月に中国山東省の威海港を出港し、釜山（プサン）港に入港したことも確認された。ＤＥＹＩ号は当時、韓国港湾当局に目的地をウラジオストクと届けたが、釜山港を出港した後、ＡＩＳをオフにして姿をくらました。これを含め、この船舶がＡＩＳをオンにして公開運航記録を残したのはこの１年間で２件にすぎない。そのため、韓米当局はＤＥＹＩ号がＡＩＳをオフにして長期間、対北朝鮮制裁違反活動を続けてきたと推定している。

ＤＥＹＩ号は香港所在の会社が所有する船舶と把握された。「アジア太平洋地域港湾局統制委員会安全検査資料」などによると、この船舶は「香港ウィリム海運有限公司」が所有主と表記されている。ただし、２０２２年２月に設立された同社は、香港市内のショッピングセンターの建物に住所を登記している。業種や電話番号などは一切公表していない。

ＤＥＹＩ号は０６年２月から２２年８月まで約１６年、中国国旗を掲げて航海していたが、昨年５月からトーゴ国旗に変えて運航していたことが分かった。現在はトーゴ国旗の期限も切れて無国籍だ。

船社が香港にあるにもかかわらず、このように国旗を別の場所に変えたのは、「便宜置籍（船舶を自国ではなく第３国に登録する）」制度を活用するためとみられる。船舶に対する管轄・管理の責任は、船舶が掲げている旗、つまり旗国にあるという原則がある。そのため、旗を変えれば、公海上で問題が発生しても、この原則のために国際社会の積極的な制裁が難しくなる可能性がある。一部ではこれをめぐって、「国連安保理の対北朝鮮制裁を回避することが狙い」という批判もある。

北朝鮮が違法な石炭輸出のために香港に幽霊会社を設立し、船舶を運航した可能性も否定できない。１８年に国連の対北朝鮮制裁対象に指定された北朝鮮の船舶「長安号」も、香港に設立された「長安海運技術有限公司」の所有だった。

申圭鎭

South Korea detains stateless cargo ship to investigate sanctions breaches　04/05/24 (Insurance Marine News)

South Korea’s Foreign Ministry has confirmed media reports that it had detained a cargo ship that was underway near the port of Yeosu, transiting the waters between South Korea and Japan.

The Ministry said that the government was conducting an investigation based on cooperation with the US into allegations of sanctions violations by a general cargo ship named De Yi (IMO 8360676).

The vessel was asserted to have refused to stop when so ordered by the South Korean Coast Guard. The vessel was then redirected to Busan anchorage, where it arrived on March 30th. However, there are reports that the crew continued to refuse to cooperate, refusing so far to open the ship’s cargo hatches for inspection.

South Korea recently has taken an increased number of unilateral steps against North Korea. These have included sanctioning ships involved in the weapons trade with Russia and reportedly increasing monitoring of North Korea for sanctions violations.

Reports are calling the vessel stateless with international databases also listing the flag and ownership as unknown. Built in 2006, the vessel’s last known owner and operator was registered in Hong Kong. Since being built, the ship was registered in China, but it appears to have been sold in 2022. What looks to be a prime example of a “shadow fleet” vessel was renamed and in 2023 was registered as Togo-flagged, although that might no longer be operative.

South Korea said that the ship was believed to have been in North Korea’s Namo Port before proceeding to Shandong, China. At the time it was detained it was reporting Vladivostok, Russia as its destination. The report said there are 13 crewmembers, including a Chinese captain and Chinese and Indonesian crewmembers aboard.

Actions such as this against merchant ships that are underway are very rare. Such detentions as do take place tend to be when the vessel is in a port.

2006-built, 2,999 gt De Yi is reported as having a Hong Kong-addressed owner and manager. Marine Traffic has it as Togo-flagged. As of April 4th it was Stopped at Busan Anchorage.

北·中を経てロシア行きの無国籍船舶 麗水付近の領海通過中に抑留 中国国籍の船長、貨物車の開放を拒否 04/03/24（聯合ニュース）

3日、釜山甘川（プサン·カムチョン）港近くの墓薄地に北朝鮮制裁違反行為に関与した疑いが持たれている船舶（3000トン級·乗組員13人）が停泊している。 聯合ニュース

政府が最近、北朝鮮を出発して中国からロシアに向かっていた無国籍船舶1隻を領海で拿捕した。 該当船舶が国連安全保障理事会（安保理）の対北朝鮮制裁違反に関与したと疑われる状況で調査を進めている。

3日、外交部などによると、先月30日頃、全羅南道麗水付近の海上で制裁違反行為に関与した疑いが持たれている3000トン級の貨物船を拿捕した。

同船は「ザ·イー（DEYI）」号で先月末、北朝鮮の南浦（ナムポ）港を出発し、中国山東省の須島（スダオ）を経てロシアのウラジオストクに向かう途中、韓国領海を通過して拿捕された。

海洋警察は、該当船舶を釜山南港に移動させたという。 当時、船舶には中国人船長と中国とインドネシア国籍の船員など13人が搭乗していたという。

該当船舶がどのような対北朝鮮制裁違反行為に関与したのかは明らかにされていない。 現在、船長が貨物窓の開放を拒否し、調査に応じないため、調査関係者らが内部貨物を具体的に確認できずにいるという。

ただ、以前にも北朝鮮がトーゴなどで船舶の国籍を偽装して石炭、精製油などを運送した事例があり、今回も類似の事例であると見て調査が進められている。 2019年、政府はトーゴ国籍の「タレントエース」号が北漢山石炭を運搬した疑惑で拿捕し抑留した。

今回の拿捕は、米国が該当船舶の制裁違反行為への関与が疑われるという情況情報を韓国政府に提供したことで行われたという。

外交部当局者は「該当船舶の安保理対北朝鮮制裁決議違反の疑いと関連して韓米間の緊密な共助を土台に調査を実施している」と明らかにした。

2017年に採択された安保理対北朝鮮制裁決議2397号は、国連加盟国が対北朝鮮制裁上禁止行為に関与した疑いのある船舶を自国の領海上で拿捕·検索·抑留することができると規定している。

韓国政府　対北制裁違反疑いの無国籍船を拿捕 04/03/24（聯合ニュース）

韓国当局が対北朝鮮制裁違反への関与が疑われる無国籍船を拿捕したことが分かった＝３日、釜山（聯合ニュース）

【釜山、ソウル聯合ニュース】韓国当局が、国連安全保障理事会の対北朝鮮制裁違反への関与が疑われる無国籍の船舶を領海上で拿捕（だほ）していたことが、3日分かった。

　安保消息筋によると、当局は先月30日ごろ、南西部の全羅南道・麗水付近の海上で制裁違反行為に関与した疑いのある3000トン級の貨物船を拿捕した。

　停船命令に応じなかったため、海洋警察が船内に入って釜山南港に移動させたという。船舶には当時、中国人の船長と中国人やインドネシア人の船員13人が乗っていた。

　この船舶がどのような違反行為に関与したのかは明らかにされていない。船舶側が貨物室の開放を拒否しており、当局は船内の貨物を確認できていないという。

　2017年に採択された安保理の「制裁決議2397」は、国連加盟国が禁止行為に関与した疑いのある船舶を自国の領海上で拿捕、検査、抑留することができると定めている。　　

Venezuelan Oil Exports Flow Using False Documents, Ships Linked to Iran 11/30/22（MARNELINK）

By Marianna Parraga and Jonathan Saul

When the supertanker Young Yong sailed to the Chinese port of Qingdao in September last year, it had quality certificates for its cargo stating it was transporting Malaysian crude oil, according to the documents reviewed by Reuters.

But satellite images and photos show the Chinese-owned ship had loaded the oil four months earlier in Venezuela, an OPEC nation in South America under U.S. oil sanctions.

The Young Yong is one of three vessels identified by Reuters that were chartered by little-known companies to export Venezuelan oil and used false documents to conceal its origin, according to shipping documents and 11 sources with knowledge of the trade.

Two of those tankers, including the Young Yong, were designated this month by U.S. authorities for violating sanctions on Iran, one of Venezuela's closest allies.

Six shipping and oil trading specialists told Reuters the use of false documents to conceal cargoes originating in sanctioned countries including Venezuela and Iran has increased compliance risks for oil and trading companies, amid a proliferation of international sanctions.

"It's now becoming clear you cannot trust certificates of origin even when they come with official government documentation," said Cari Stinebower, a U.S.-based partner with law firm Winston & Strawn, who advises oil and trading companies how to comply with sanctions.

The Young Yong was one of several tankers named by the U.S. Treasury on Nov. 3 as part of a "smuggling network" that has used forged documentation to ship Iranian oil to finance Iran's Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah. The Treasury designated the tanker as a frozen asset and placed its owner, Marshall Islands-registered Technology Bright, under sanctions.

The U.S. Treasury declined to comment on the involvement of the Young Yong or the other vessels identified by Reuters in shipping Venezuelan crude.

Stinebower, who previously worked as a legal counsel for the U.S. Treasury's sanctions enforcement arm OFAC, said the use of false documents to conceal the origin of cargoes was pioneered by Iran to avoid U.S. sanctions. Citing cases she has worked on as a commercial lawyer, Stinebower said it appeared the technique was now being adopted to transport Venezuelan oil but she declined to provide further details.

Venezuela's oil ministry and state-owned oil company PDVSA did not respond to requests for comment. Iran's mission to the United Nations in New York also did not respond to Reuters questions.

PDVSA documents reviewed by Reuters said a vessel named the Comuna loaded 1.98 million barrels of oil in the Venezuelan port of Jose from May 11 to 21 last year.

However, independent monitoring company TankerTrackers.com, which specializes in analyzing vessel movements for insurance and shipowners' research, used satellite images and photos to identify the tanker as the Young Yong.

The images show the vessel's name had been painted over but the tanker is identifiable because of the distinctive white arches flanking its bridge, the position of the cranes on its deck and the shape of its funnel, said Samir Madani, TankerTrackers.com's owner.

When the Young Yong set sail from Venezuela after loading the oil, its location transmitter showed it departing from the West African port of Lome.

The Young Yong then stopped near Malaysia between early July and August 2021. While there, on July 8, it obtained a quality certificate from Singapore-based laboratory Saybolt that identified its cargo as Malaysian heavy crude – which has similar characteristics to Venezuela's Merey 16 crude grade. The certificate measures aspects of oil - such as its density and its levels of sulfur and metals - that allow a buyer to be sure a cargo is within a contract's specifications.

Saybolt's U.S. owner, Core Laboratories N.V. CLB.N, said in a statement to Reuters that it had certified the crude as Malaysian heavy oil blend based on documentation it received from the client and its analysis of the quality of the oil. The company said it had no reason to doubt this was the case. It did not identify who the client was.

The quality certificate was shared with Reuters by advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which tracks shipments potentially violating sanctions.

Shipping database Equasis listed contact details for the Young Yong's owner Technology Bright as care of Hong Kong-based East Wind Ship Management. A Reuters reporter could not find East Wind Ship Management at the address listed in the database nor find a contact elsewhere to seek comment. Reuters was unable to identify the buyer of the oil in China.

Indonesian authorities said in early November that the Young Yong had run aground off the Riau Islands on Oct. 26. UANI said it was carrying Venezuelan fuel oil when it ran aground and was likely trying to reach Nipah, a popular ship-to-ship transfer hub near Indonesian waters, according to satellite pictures and vessel tracking, analyzed by the advocacy group.

Unsuccessful sanctions Christian M. Ingerslev, chief executive of Maersk Tankers, said the proliferation of sanctions had led to "separate fleets and separate markets run in parallel": some vessels were operating off-the-radar to service sanctioned countries, sometimes without proper insurance, he said.

London-headquartered ship broker Braemar PLC BRMS.L estimated that the total fleet servicing Iran and Venezuela, despite U.S. sanctions, consists of more than two hundred tankers, including some 82 supertankers like the Young Yong that can carry up to two million barrels of oil each.

The United States imposed oil trading sanctions on Venezuela in 2019 after calling Maduro's re-election the previous year a sham. Washington has maintained pressure on the socialist leader to hold fair elections and release political prisoners: it said last week it could relax sanctions if there is progress in talks between Maduro's government and the opposition.

The use of a wide array of tactics - including false documentation, fake vessel names and ship-to-ship transfers of cargoes at sea - has enabled Venezuela to export more than 360 million barrels of crude and fuel since the imposition of U.S. sanctions, according to Reuters calculations based on PDVSA's internal documents and ship tracking data.

That represents more than two-thirds of Venezuela's total oil exports from 2019 through October 2022. The remainder went either directly to its ally Cuba or to other destinations in the Caribbean and Europe under exemptions to U.S. sanctions, according to the Reuters calculations.

PDVSA did not respond to a request for comment on those figures.

When asked about Reuters' findings about the use of false documentation by vessels carrying Venezuelan crude, a U.S. State Department spokesperson said: "our Venezuela sanctions remain in effect".

PDVSA documents from May 2021 listed Yunshu Maritime Ltd as the charterer of the Comuna – the name used by the Young Yong to load Venezuela crude that month. The PDVSA shipping documents and invoices for the cargo dated September 2021 did not provide contact details for Yunshu Maritime. Reuters was unable to find a website or address for the company.

Yunshu Maritime was also the charterer for another supertanker that loaded Venezuelan oil in May 2021 under the name Joy, PDVSA's loading schedules showed. Using satellite images and photos, TankerTrackers.com identified that vessel as the Panamanian-flagged tanker Adisa, which was also blacklisted this month by the U.S. Treasury for transporting Iranian oil.

The Treasury said the vessel is controlled by a company owned by Viktor Artemov, a Ukrainian national who oversees a network of cover companies used to sell sanctioned Iranian oil and channel the proceeds to the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah.

Artemov, who has been placed under U.S. sanctions, did not respond to requests for comment.

The Treasury named the Adisa's owner as Triton Navigation Corp, which is listed on Equasis as care of Thomarose Global Ventures. Reuters was unable to locate Nigeria-based Thomarose Global Ventures for comment.

The Adisa set its location signal to make it appear that it set sail from Africa in early June 2021 with Malaysia as its destination. The vessel made a stop in Malaysia between July and early September and then switched its transponder off for about a week before reappearing near Qingdao in mid-September, where it discharged, according to ship tracking data.

However, a bill of lading for the Adisa dated June 3, 2021 and issued by West Atlantic Port Services in Togo said the vessel had loaded 1.89 million barrels of West African blended heavy crude oil, according to the document reviewed by Reuters. West Atlantic Port Services did not answer phone calls for comment.

(Reuters - Additional reporting by Daphne Psaledakis and Matt Spetalnick and Michelle Nichols; Editing by Daniel Flynn)

Shipbreaking # 68 – February 2023（MARNELINK）

Uei Maru (ex-Oei Maru). IMO 8810334. Length 70 m, 757 t. Mongolian flag. Unknown classification society. Built in 1988 in Saiki (Japan) by Miura. Owned since November 2020 by Forward Marine Ltd (Hong Kong, China). She was reportedly scrapped in Ningde (China) in September 2016 but actually escaped the blowtorches. Her Automatic Identification system has been switched off since February 2017. Though, she has kept on sailing, flying the flag of Belize then of Sierra Leone and performing undisclosed traffics. Since November 2020, she has been inspected eight times in the Vietnamese port of Quangninh. The 28 reported deficiencies did not lead to any detention. In September 2022, Hong Kong (China) inspectors reported 15 deficiencies. Six were related to fire safety, emergency systems, safety of navigation and to maintenance of the ship and equipment and were considered as grounds for detention. The Uei Maru was finally beached in Chattogram flying the flag of Mongolia on October 13, 2022.

New report sheds light on vessel identity laundering 09/24/21（SAFETY4SEA）

by The Editorial Team

Vessel identity laundering operations jeopardize the integrity of the IMO ship registration system, which the world relies upon in order to identify, track, and interact with the 60,000 ships, finds a new report.

According to C4ADS, vessel identity laundering is a novel tactic in which one or more vessels adopt a different identity on Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions in order to allow “dirty” ships to assume “clean” identities, and involves at least one vessel in this operation assuming an identity that is obtained by defrauding the IMO.

Vessel identity laundering is significantly more sophisticated than previously observed instances of “vessel identity tampering,” in which vessels modify their physical appearance or broadcast false data on AIS transmissions. Given its complexity, vessel identity laundering presents unprecedented challenges for maritime regulators and risks undermining global shipping practices

In recent years, C4ADS has observed at least 11 ships engaging in elaborate schemes to create fraudulent ship registrations with the IMO, which are subsequently used to “launder” the identity of vessels that have been associated with illicit activities. In particular, we have seen networks involved in DPRK sanctions evasion and smuggling use these tactics to avoid the heightened scrutiny of the sanctions regime.

This issue brief seeks to empower law enforcement and civil regulators to detect and disrupt vessel identity laundering operations by explaining how vessel identity laundering operations work and demonstrating how they can be detected using AIS data, satellite imagery, IMO registration records, and other sources of publicly available information.

The KINGSWAY, sanctioned by the UN Security Council (UNSC) for engaging in a ship-to-ship transfer with a North Korean tanker, laundered its identity into the APEX/SHUN FA in late 2018.

• The SUBBLIC, recommended for designation by the UN Panel of Experts for numerous deliveries of fuel to North Korea, laundered its identity into the HAI ZHOU 168 in mid-2019.
• In light of this report’s findings, the authors suggest the following recommendations for the maritime community and its regulators.

Registered Identity

• The IMO should require resubmission of vessel photographs and current details from operators at regular intervals for ships to maintain their registration, and deregister noncompliant vessels.
• The IMO should publish a list of IMO numbers that are cancelled and vessels whose registrations are rescinded.
• The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee should coordinate a working group of representatives from government, industry, and civil society organizations to strengthen risk screening procedures for the IMO number application process.
• The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee should promote transparency of the IMO number system by publishing annual reports that outline the measures taken to combat IMO number fraud, statistics on registration trends, case studies, and other guidance on evasion typologies. Digital Identity
• The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee should coordinate a working group of representatives from government, industry, and civil society organizations to develop hardware and software security standards for preventing the tampering of AIS transponders. This working group should produce a list of AIS transponder models that meet anti-tampering standards for both Class A and Class B transponders. The transponder model’s certification should be reviewed regularly. Flag registries and other maritime authorities should implement tools and methods to detect AIS tampering or anomalies by ships under their jurisdiction, and information on detected cases should be published and shared with other maritime regulators.

Physical Identity
All maritime regulators and enforcement agencies should detain and investigate ships that have painted over their original IMO number and marked a different one, as well as any other entities responsible for facilitating identity tampering.

Data Sharing

The IMO should mandate the expansion of ship information provided in GISIS to include the following data points:

• Vessel specifications (e.g. length, breadth, gross tonnage, deadweight tonnage);
• Historical MMSI numbers and call signs, complete with periods of use;
• Photographs submitted to the IMO.

In addition:

• The IMO should mandate the GISIS to distinguish whether a vessel’s flag registration is provisional or permanent. If a vessel’s flag registration is provisional, GISIS should indicate the date of issue and expiry. GISIS should prominently mark the vessels whose provisional flag registration status has expired.
• The IMO should create a secure communication channel where the public and whistleblowers can submit information on vessels, individuals, companies, and officials that are abusing or facilitating the abuse of the IMO number system.
• The UN Panel of Experts on the DPRK should include in its midterm and final reports a table of fraudulent IMO-registered and AIS identities used by vessels linked to DPRK sanctions evasion activities.
• Governments should regularly publish circulars and advisories that include lists of fraudulent IMO-registered and AIS identities used by DPRK-linked vessels. Governments should ensure that these blacklists are disseminated to authorities responsible for maritime security.

Smugglers fake ship identities to evade North Korea sanctions--research report 09/10/21（REUTERS）

SEOUL--Smugglers suspected of evading sanctions on North Korea have turned to schemes to create fraudulent identities for sanctioned ships, a U.S.-based research group said in a report released on Thursday.

Ships suspected of smuggling have long modified their physical appearance or broadcast false position data, said the report from C4ADS, a non-profit group.

But the practice of “vessel identity laundering” is significantly more sophisticated and not only undermines sanctions but jeopardizes the integrity of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) ship registration system, it added.

“Given its complexity, vessel identity laundering presents unprecedented challenges for maritime regulators and risks undermining global shipping practices,” the report said.

When asked about the report, a spokesperson for the IMO, the United Nations’ shipping agency, said any specific unlawful practices should be brought to the organization so they could be addressed.

“IMO has been working to address issues related to fraudulent registration and related unlawful practices including the registration of vessels without the knowledge or approval of the relevant national maritime administration,” the spokesperson added. “This work is ongoing.”

North Korea is under strict international sanctions imposed over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Talks aimed at persuading Pyongyang to give up those weapons in return for lifting sanctions have been stalled.

Independent sanctions monitors have reported to the United Nations that North Korea has continued to evade sanctions, albeit at a lower level since the country imposed its own border lockdowns to prevent a coronavirus outbreak since last year.

“The international shipping order has operated on the basis that an IMO number is an authoritative and unique identifier issued to one ship--a real ship, if that has ever needed to be spelled out,” C4ADS said.

But the group’s case studies of two ships allegedly involved in evading North Korea sanctions show how the IMO registration process can be hijacked to issue a registered identity to a non-existent vessel, which in turn can be used to disguise the identity of other ships, the report said.

C4ADS, which says it provides data-driven analysis and reporting on global conflict and security issues, said overall it had observed at least 11 ships engaging in elaborate schemes to create fraudulent ship registrations in recent years.

The C4ADS report outlined ways that law enforcement and civil regulators might detect and disrupt the activities of such vessels using tracking data, satellite imagery, IMO registration records, and other sources of publicly available information.

安保理報告　北朝鮮、中国への漁業権の売却も横行　制裁破り続く　韓国は石油移転届け出ず　01/31/19（産経新聞）

　【ニューヨーク＝上塚真由】国連安全保障理事会で北朝鮮制裁決議の履行状況を監視する専門家パネルの調査で、北朝鮮が外貨稼ぎのため、昨年１～１１月に少なくとも１５隻の中国漁船に対し、漁業権を売却していたことが判明した。国連外交筋が明らかにした。専門家パネルは、北朝鮮による制裁破りの新たな手口として警戒を呼びかけている。

　専門家パネルは過去１年間の制裁の履行状況の報告書を近くまとめ、公表する予定だ。

　国連外交筋によると、北朝鮮の漁業免許を所持する中国漁船は、日本海や東シナ海などで確認された。漁業関係者の証言では、北朝鮮近海で約２００隻の中国漁船が操業し、免許は月５万元（約８１万円）で売られているという。中国漁船が北朝鮮の国旗を掲げて偽装工作を行っている実態も確認された。漁業権の販売・移転は２０１７年１２月に採択された安保理決議で禁止されている。

　海上で違法に石油精製品などの積み荷を移し替える「瀬取り」についても、船体を偽装するなど手口を巧妙化させて継続していると指摘。専門家パネルの調査では昨年２月以降、少なくとも５０隻の船舶と１６０の企業が関与したことが分かったという。

　また、韓国による制裁違反も新たに判明。北朝鮮・開城に昨年開設された南北共同連絡事務所で使う石油精製品を国連安保理に届けずに北朝鮮に持ち込んでいた。韓国側は専門家パネルの調査に対し、約３４０トンを運び込み、使用しなかった約４トンだけを持ち帰ったことを認めたという。安保理決議では北朝鮮への石油精製品移転を報告するよう加盟国に義務付けている。

　専門家パネルは、北朝鮮は核・ミサイル開発計画を継続していると分析した。衛星画像から、北朝鮮の寧（ニョン）辺（ビョン）の核施設で昨年２～１１月に新たな施設や水路の建設が確認され、同６月中旬には稼働していることを示す排水作業も行われたとしている。

追い出された北の漁船、日本ＥＥＺ内でイカ乱獲　01/31/19（読売新聞）

　国連安全保障理事会の経済制裁下で外貨獲得に苦しむ北朝鮮にとって、中国漁船への漁業権売却が貴重な外貨獲得源となっていることが、対北朝鮮制裁決議の履行を監視する北朝鮮制裁委員会の専門家パネルの年次報告書で明らかになった。中朝国境地帯の中国側の複数の漁業関係者は読売新聞の取材に、漁業権売却が制裁対象と明記された２０１７年１２月以降も売買は横行していると証言した。

　◆「証拠残さない」

　１月下旬、丹東近郊を訪れると、中国と北朝鮮の間を流れる鴨緑江河口付近の港に、中国と北朝鮮の双方の国旗を掲げた漁船２隻が係留されていた。地元住民によると、いずれも渤海や黄海といった近海で操業する漁船で、海が荒れる真冬は漁に出ていないという。

　２隻が漁業権を北朝鮮から購入した船かどうかは不明だが、漁業権売買に詳しい関係者によると、北朝鮮の漁業権を購入した中国漁船は、北朝鮮漁船を装うため北朝鮮国旗を掲げるのが一般的という。

　この関係者によると、北朝鮮側が売買を持ちかけるのは主に、北朝鮮東部・元山（ウォンサン）沖の日本海でのイカ漁と、西側の黄海での近海漁業の権利だ。北朝鮮側が中国の仲介業者に提示する漁業権売却の値段は、日本海側であれば６～１１月の１漁期当たり１隻約５万ドル（約５４５万円）、黄海は１か月当たり１隻約５０００ドル（約５４万５０００円）が相場という。１７年１２月に国連安保理の追加制裁決議で漁業権売買が明確に禁止される前は正式な契約書も交わされていたが、昨年からは「証拠を残さないよう口頭での取引になった」という。

　特に日本海のイカ漁は、中国の禁漁期とも重なる６～９月が最盛期とされ、昨年も、北朝鮮と国境を接する遼寧省のほか、福建省や浙江省、山東省からも、多くの船が仲介業者を通して漁業権を買って漁に出たという。

　丹東はその漁業権取引の主要な舞台だ。北朝鮮当局の水産部門担当者が丹東を訪れ、仲介業者と漁業権売却のやりとりをする。仲介業者から北朝鮮側への支払いは、中国当局の監視を避けるため、両替が必要な米ドルを使わず、主に人民元でなされるという。

　◆イカを乱獲

　漁業権を購入した中国漁船が北朝鮮周辺海域で操業する際、北朝鮮漁船は自国海域から追い出されているとの見方が強い。日本政府関係者は「追い出された北朝鮮漁船が、より沖合の日本の排他的経済水域（ＥＥＺ）内にまで出て違法操業をするようになった」と指摘する。日本海の能登半島沖の好漁場「大和（やまと）堆（たい）」周辺では１７年以降、大量の北朝鮮漁船が押し寄せてイカを乱獲し、すでに深刻な問題となっている。

Fake Flags: At-Sea Sanctions Enforcement and Ship Identity Falsification
Fraudulent ship registration makes the already challenge task of sanctions enforcement more difficult.
By Olivia Vassalotti and Cameron Trainer
09/26/18（The Diplomat）

On February 24, 2018, a patrol aircraft of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force found a North Korea-flagged vessel, the Chon Ma San, engaged in what appeared to be a ship-to-ship transfer with another vessel. Such transfers are prohibited under United Nations sanctions on North Korea. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a notice on its website identifying the other vessel as a Maldives-registered tanker, the Xin Yuan 18. There was just one issue: the vessel was never registered by the Maldives.

The identity falsification perpetrated by the Xin Yuan 18 is far from an isolated case. On the contrary, the problem is surprisingly widespread and vastly undertreated. It circumvents the process by which countries regulate the use of their flag for international trade. Some countries allow foreign-owned or controlled vessels to use their flag through an open registry. Others may choose to only register vessels with ties to the country through ownership or crewing. This is termed a closed registry. Still others just choose not to allow the use of their flag for international trade at all. All can be affected by vessel identity falsification.

This falsification can take different forms, from a vessel continuing to claim a country’s flag after being struck from its flag registry, to manipulating the information a ship transmits to broadcast incorrect information, to an unusual and highly concerning phenomenon: the creation of fraudulent national flag registries. Though a range of actors looking to mask illicit trade may exploit these approaches to hide their activity, North Korea is actively making use of all three.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

The first variant is simple for a vessel’s owners and managers to perpetrate. A vessel, after its registration with a country is either terminated or expired, simply continues to use the identification it was once legitimately issued. After Cambodian authorities decided to close their registry, which had been used by North Korean-controlled vessels looking to evade UN sanctions, some of those vessels continued — in violation of national law — to fly the Cambodian flag.

The second method, broadcasting a falsified identity, is also relatively straightforward. All vessels over 300 gross tons are required to have an Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmitting information about their course and identity, including name, flag, and call sign. Vessels engaged in illicit activity often alter these transmissions to reflect either entirely fictional identity information or that of another vessel. All a ship operator needs to do is manually input false information into the ship’s AIS transponder.

One example of this practice is the O Ka San, a vessel listed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as being previously flagged to North Korea, but now having an “unknown” country of registration. The ship’s most recent AIS transmission on July 6, 2017, captured by ship-tracking platform MarineTraffic, identified the vessel as the Sarisa, a container ship flagged to Tanzania. According to the official IMO database, the vessel was never known by that name, nor was it ever registered in Tanzania. In fact, no ship named Sarisa exists in the IMO database. The vessel likely altered its AIS transmissions to avoid restrictions on North Korea and its vessels.

The third type of identity falsification – the issuance of fraudulent registration documents to the IMO without the knowledge of the country in question – is significantly more complex and represents a major maritime governance challenge.

In the case of the Xin Yuan 18 described above, for instance, the Maldives Defense Intelligence Service alleges that a Maldives national communicated with the IMO using a Gmail account fraudulently created in the name of a former employee of the Maldives Transport Authority, the body responsible for registering vessels. Using this email, he provided the IMO with fraudulent registration documents for the ship, which appropriated the call sign of a legally registered Maldivian fishing vessel. These documents appear to have been accepted as proof of registration by the IMO, despite not resembling those normally used by the Maldives.

In other cases, companies have posed as national shipping registries, leading to hundreds of vessels claiming the country’s flag without its knowledge or authorization. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Fiji, Micronesia, Nauru, and Samoa have all fallen victim to this kind of fraud despite not authorizing the use of their flag for international trade. In all of these cases, at least one company was created for the sole purpose of operating a fraudulent registry, and the effort was facilitated by authentic-looking websites which at first — and even second — glance appeared to be perfectly legitimate.

Perhaps the most startling is the case of Micronesia. Over 300 vessels may have flown the country’s flag. This was made possible by the IMO erroneously recognizing the fraudulent registry as an official Micronesian entity. In addition, Fiji is investigating 91 reported cases of vessels claiming its flag without authorization, at least 20 of which were linked to North Korea.

It is unclear what proportion of vessel owners were aware of the fraudulent nature of the registrations, but it seems plausible that at least some were unsuspecting victims.

Vessel identity falsification, in whatever form it takes, represents a global maritime safety, security and governance challenge. Fraudulent registries of the kind set up for Micronesia deny that country the revenue associated with operating a registry, while affiliating potentially suspect vessels with the country without their knowledge. They can also serve as a method for vessels to engage in a form of “reputation laundering,” by allowing ships to mask a history of illicit activity before migrating to a legitimate or more reputable registry. Case in point, the Lian De was deregistered by Tanzania in July 2016 for its links to North Korea, then fraudulently registered under the Fijian flag, and subsequently registered to Panama – the world’s largest open registry – in March 2017.

Fraudulent registrations may also hinder the processes for dealing with a maritime emergency. For example, in January of last year the cargo vessel Tong Da ran aground in Japan while claiming the Fijian flag. In scenarios like this, the vessel’s flag state is generally responsible for rectifying the situation. In this case, however, Fijian authorities reported no record of the vessel when queried by the Japanese, and the vessel appears to have been salvaged without Fijian participation. Similar issues could arise in the case of interdictions of vessels in international waters, which normally require the consent of the vessel’s flag country. It is unclear how this consent would be acquired for a fraudulently registered vessel or, indeed, whether such consent is even needed to interdict a vessel without valid registration.

Vessel identity falsification is a complex issue with implications for the IMO and its members, whether they operate open registries or not. It is even an issue for non-members like Micronesia, that have found themselves the victims of astonishingly brazen acts of fraud. The IMO appears to have finally recognized this, and recently added the subject to the agenda of its Legal Committee. In the readout from that meeting, the IMO claims to have circulated information “[…] to ensure that port State control officers were also informed and would take appropriate action against ships fraudulently flying a flag.” Despite this, it does not appear that much progress has been made in curbing the practice of identify falsification; ships continue to be detained claiming Micronesian and Samoan registration.

While the IMO has begun taking a stand on the issue, this cannot be solved by the IMO alone. The IMO must first take steps to ensure they never again authorize fraudulent registries or accept forged documents, as highlighted in the cases above. But even more importantly, the IMO must coordinate the actions of the international maritime community and act as a leader in encouraging states to share information and act on instances of identity manipulation in their jurisdictions. Increased communication between governments, registrars, and the IMO will reduce gaps and uncertainties currently exploited by illicit actors in the maritime space. This problem will not be solved quickly, but increasing communication and due diligence in the maritime sphere will go a long way towards reducing opportunities for fraud.

Olivia Vassalotti is a researcher interested in nonproliferation, trade controls, and sanctions evasion and implementation.

Cameron Trainer is a Research Associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies currently focusing on sanctions policy and implementation.

北朝鮮 制裁破り巧妙化　船体偽装、原油積み込み　報告書　02/03/18（毎日新聞）

　【ニューヨーク國枝すみれ、バンコク西脇真一】国連安全保障理事会の北朝鮮制裁委員会の専門家パネルは２日までに、北朝鮮が昨年１２月に採択された石油制裁を破り、その手口を巧妙化させていると懸念する年次報告書をまとめた。今月中にも発表する。ミャンマーなどが北朝鮮と軍事協力を続けている可能性にも注目している。

　報告書は、北朝鮮のタンカーが公海上などで別の船から石油精製品や原油を積み込んでいることが確認されたとして、海上自衛隊の哨戒機が１月２０日に発見した上海沖での積み込み事例にも言及。北朝鮮の国旗を消し、船名や船体の色も変えていたと指摘し「高度な偽装が行われている」と警告した。

　また、北朝鮮が制裁対象の石炭輸出などで２０１７年に約２億ドル（約２２０億円）を獲得したと指摘。北朝鮮産の石炭は昨年８月に全面禁輸となったが、北朝鮮はそれ以降にも少なくとも２３回、原産地を詐称して輸出した疑いがあるとしている。北朝鮮産の石炭を輸入したとされる国は、ベトナム、ロシア、中国、韓国、マレーシアなど。日本の購入は確認されていない。

　さらに、北朝鮮がミャンマーに「弾道ミサイルシステムを渡した証拠がある」との情報が寄せられたと明記した。制裁対象となっている北朝鮮の「朝鮮鉱業貿易開発会社（ＫＯＭＩＤ）」がミャンマーのミサイル技術者を招請していたという。ミャンマーが昨年６月に北朝鮮の外交官をＫＯＭＩＤに所属していたとして追放したことについては評価した。

　ミャンマーと北朝鮮の軍事協力関係を巡っては、００年前後からミャンマー軍事政権が北朝鮮から武器や軍事物資を輸入するなど関係を緊密化したとされる。ミャンマーの民主化勢力が「北朝鮮の支援を受け核開発に着手した」と国際社会に告発したこともあったが、民政移管後の１２年、当時の国防相は国際会議で「そのような（軍事協力）関係は中止した」と発言した。

　報告書には、軍事情報提供の時期は明らかにしていない。ミャンマーの技術者や北朝鮮外交官の活動を調査しているとみられる。

位置追跡避け、船名も変更…制裁をあざ笑う北朝鮮密輸船　09/14/17（中央日報日本語版）

１２日（現地時間）米ワシントンの下院外交委員会公聴会。米財務省のマーシャル・ビリングズリー・テロ・金融情報担当次官補が衛星写真と地図をスライド画面で見せながら、中国とロシアが北朝鮮の石炭密輸出を支援していると批判した。

米情報当局が注目した「バイメイ８」という船は、カリブ海のセントクリストファーネイビスの国旗を付けてロシアへ向かう予定だったが、「トランスポンダー」（船の位置を知らせる無線信号機）を消して北朝鮮に入り、石炭を積載した。北朝鮮を出た後にトランスポンダーをつけたこの船はロシアのウラジオストクに一日停泊した後、中国に向かい、石炭を降ろした。

ビリングズリー次官補は「パナマ国旗を付けた『サンユニオン号』とジャマイカ国旗を付けた『グレートスピリング号」の２隻も北朝鮮からロシアに石炭を運ぶのを助けて中国に戻った。北朝鮮が船舶の正体を操作した」とし「明白な制裁回避」と主張した。共和党のテッド・ポー議員は「数年間、我々は北朝鮮の金氏一家に弄ばれた」と述べた。

北朝鮮の船舶偽装と不透明な船舶貿易ネットワークが、国際社会の制裁の中でも北朝鮮経済が持ちこたえることができた要因ということだ。

英フィナンシャルタイムズ（ＦＴ）は１３日、北朝鮮国籍と疑われる数百隻の船が香港に基盤を置く幽霊海運会社により所有・運営されていて、国旗を変えたり所有権を変更する形で経済制裁を避けている報じた。シンクタンク「米国企業研究所（ＡＥＩ）」の関係者は「クモの巣のような船舶貿易ネットワークが北朝鮮の貿易と通貨の均衡を維持している」と述べた。

ＦＴは香港の会社ユニオンリンクインターナショナルが所有する「ドルフィン２６号」が代表的な例だと紹介した。この会社は中国・タンザニア・パラオなどの国旗が付いた小規模な貨物船を保有している。欧州船舶情報システム（Ｅｑｕａｓｉｓ）によると、「ドルフィン２６号」は過去８年間に所有主と管理人が６回、船舶名が３回変更している。付けている国旗は５年間に４回変わった。同社が管理する「オリエンタルレディー号」も２００３年以降、国旗を６回変えたが、うち２回は北朝鮮だった。このようにすれば船舶の背後と活動を追跡するのが難しくなると、専門家らは指摘した。

米国安保分野研究機関Ｃ４ＡＤＳは北朝鮮関連の事業にかかわる海運会社２４８社のうち１６０社が香港に登録されていると発表した。この機関の報告書によると、これら海運会社は船舶の国旗を何度も変え、資産がない形だけの幽霊会社を設立して登録する方法で実際の所有主を隠している。同じ住所に登録された船会社もいくつか確認されたと、ＦＴは伝えた。

米ピーターソン国際経済研究所の北朝鮮専門家マーカス・ノーランド氏は「北朝鮮の国旗を付けた老朽船舶は取り締まりのターゲットになるため北朝鮮貿易の中心から遠ざかり、東南アジアやアフリカの国旗を付けた船が増えている」と説明した。

ビリングズリー次官補は北朝鮮が制裁を避けるために船の正体を隠す欺まん的行為をするかどうか調べると明らかにした。ビリングズリー次官補は公聴会で「北朝鮮の船に保険やメンテナンスなどを提供する側も制裁のターゲットにする」と中国側に圧力を加えた。

300 ships and more than 1,000 seafarers fall for fake registry scam　04/12/2017 (Splash247)

Nicola Capuzzo

Ships and seafarers are being illegally registered under a fake international registry. The Federated States of Micronesia, a tiny archipelago in the western Pacific, has warned of the scam in a letter sent to the United Nations, seen by Splash.

“The Permanent Mission of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) wishes to inform about the illegal registration of vessels, as well as the illegal issuance of seafarers’ certification in the name of the Federated States of Micronesia,” the letter states.

The document adds: “Currently the laws of the FSM do not provide or otherwise allow for an international ship registry. In addition, FSM laws do not provide for issuance of seafarers certification in connection to an international ship registry.”

The document also emphasises the fact that while FSM is yet to be a member of the International Maritime Organization, certain individuals have nonetheless presented false documentation to the IMO stating that they are duly authorised to act as the archipelago’s ship registrar using the name Micronesia International Ship Registry. According to the official source these individuals have gained access to the IMO-assigned codes for vessels to be registered in the name of FSM.

“At this time we believe that there are approximately 300 vessels illegally registered in the name of FSM,” the letter states, adding: “The same individuals are also believed to be connected to the illegal issuance of seafarers’ certification as provided for under the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping of Seafarers (STCW) of 1978”. The FSM Government believes that more than 1,000 illegal seafarers’ certifications have been issued until now.

The Federated States of Micronesia is a country spread across the western Pacific Ocean comprising more than 600 islands with a population of just over 100,000.

The website of the allegedly fake registry, littered with typos, can be accessed here.

逆、逆！外国の密輸船、中国船装うも船名の漢字に痛恨のミス—中国　09/05/17（毎日新聞）

2017年9月5日、中国紙・現代快報などによると、江蘇省塩城市の港で8月31日、砂糖を密輸するため中国船籍の船に偽装したパナマ船籍の貨物船が摘発された。船首の船名の「大慶」の文字がひっくり返った状態で印字されていたほか、船長は税関によって署名された文書を提出できなかったため、密輸事件であることが確認された。

警察は9人の身柄を拘束し、船内からタイ産の砂糖約2万5000袋、計1300トンを押収した。1000万元（約1億6700万円）近い額になるという。

乗組員の多くがインドネシア人で「このような方法で荷下ろしすれば好都合だと考えたが、塗装時に誤ってしまったようだ」などと話しているという。（翻訳・編集/柳川）

From(Maritime Connector.com)
Ship Name:	TONG DA (EX-DONG KUN 6)
IMO:	8649993
Type of ship:	GENERAL CARGO
Flag:	FIJI (EX-CAMBODIA)
Gross tonnage:	2994 tons
Year of Built:	2005
Builder:	ZHEJIANG DONGHONG SHIPYARD - XIANGSHAN, CHINA
Class Society:	KOREA CLASSIFICATION SOCIETY
Manager:	TAE DONG GANG SHIPPING - NAMP'O, NORTH KOREA
Owner:	EAST BRIGHT INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING - HONG KONG, CHINA
Former names:	PAEK SONG 5 until 2014 Jul SONG I 1 until 2013 Jan AN YUAN 2 until 2011 Nov

芦屋沖で外国船籍の貨物船座礁 01/11/17（NHK）

芦屋町の沖合で、フィジー船籍の貨物船が荷崩れを起こして浅瀬に乗り上げました。海上保安部によりますと、乗組員にけがはないということです。
１１日午後３時ごろ、芦屋町の沖合を航行していたフィジー船籍の貨物船「ＴＯＮＧＤＡ」（２９９４トン）から「船が傾いている」と、第７管区海上保安本部に無線で連絡がありました。
巡視艇などが救助に向かいましたが、貨物船は芦屋町の沖合の浅瀬に乗り上げて座礁しました。
貨物船には中国人とミャンマー人など、いずれも外国人の乗組員１４人が乗っていましたが、けが人はいないということです。
海上保安部の調べによりますと、貨物船は４１５０トンの塩を積んで、中国から青森県の八戸港に向かっていたということです。
貨物船の４０代の中国人の船長は「荷崩れを起こし左舷側に傾いた」と話しているということです。
海上保安部は、荷崩れが原因でかじがとれなくなり座礁したとみて、油の流出の有無や当時の状況を詳しく調べています。

From(Maritime Connector.com)
Ship Name:	BORNEO AQUA NO.1
IMO:	8904599
Type of ship:	FISH CARRIER
Flag:	Ship registration withdrawn (EX-MICRONESIA)
Gross tonnage:	299 tons
Year of Built:	1989
Builder:	HONDA HEAVY INDUSTRIES - SAIKI, JAPAN
Manager:	SODATRA - DAKAR, SENEGAL
Owner:	Salient Horizon Sdn Bhd
Former names:	EISHIN MARU NO.8 until 2008 Nov2

無人のオイルタンカー座礁で「幽霊船」の噂、リベリア
　Liberia investigates mystery beached 'ghost ship' 05/14/16（ＡＦＰ）